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NOTES
Federal Habeas Corpus - An Extended Remedy
I. SCOPE OF INQUIRY IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
The Judiciary Act of 1867' made the federal writ of habeas corpus
available to state prisoners. This Act raised many problems which
necessarily attend any exercise of co-ordinate jurisdiction by two
separate judicial systems. The most important of these problems was
the determination of the scope of inquiry in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, i.e., the minimal standards that a state court must satisfy to
detain the prisoner and the method of ascertaining whether these
standards in fact were met. In the early cases the scope of inquiry
was confined to an examination of the state tribunal's jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant and over the subject matter of the
case. If the state court had jurisdiction, the writ would not issue.'
The traditional jurisdictional concept of the scope of inquiry soon
was expanded by Ex parte Siebold.' That case added the requirement
that the sentencing tribunal must have proceeded under a constitu-
tional statute and, further, a prisoner convicted under an unconsti-
tutional statute could not be considered within the jurisdiction of the
court. The Supreme Court also found a lack of jurisdiction if the
trial judge imposed a sentence beyond that authorized by statute.'
Thus, for purposes of habeas corpus, the concept of jurisdiction was
extended beyond its traditional boundaries.
The Court in Frank v. Mangum' added an entirely new dimension
to the scope of inquiry. That case held that if the state did not pro-
vide the applicant an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional
issues the federal court would hear his claims in a habeas corpus
proceeding. Finally, in Brown v. Allen,' the Court ruled that if the
applicant raised his claim in the state court, perfected his appeal
'Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
'In the Matter of Moran, 203 U.S. 96 (1906); In re Belt 159 U.S. 95 (1895); Andrews
v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895); In re Schneider, 148 U.S. 162 (1893); Ex parle Yar-
brough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Ex parse Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876); Ex parte Watkins, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
'100 U.S. 371 (1879).
4E.g., Ex parle Lange 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874) (detention was void for want of
power of the judge to impose sentence of fine and imprisonment under a statute which only
authorized fine or imprisonment and defendent paid fine); Ex parle Wilson, 114 U.S. 417
(1884) (Court had no jurisdiction in case in which defendant was sentenced to hard labor
without indictment or presentment by grand jury in violation of fifth amendment rights);
In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887); cf. Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328 (1884).
5237 U.S. 309 (1915).6344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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through the state system, and was denied certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court, he then would be entitled to a full reconsidera-
tion of his constitutional claims in an application to the federal dis-
trict court for habeas corpus.7 This broadened scope of inquiry in
federal habeas corpus proceedings gives the state prisoner ample
opportunity to present constitutional claims to a federal court if
he follows the complete appellate route.8
11. THE ABORTIVE STATE PROCEEDING
A state prisoner applying for federal habeas corpus may encounter
a unique problem-the "abortive" state proceeding.! A state criminal
defendant suffers an abortive state proceeding if he fails to present
his federal questions to the state court in a manner consistent with
state procedure, and, as a result, the state remedy is foreclosed to him.
Federal district courts frequently have denied federal habeas corpus
relief to applicants who have suffered abortive state proceedings.
Although the reasons for denial have not been stated clearly, the
results have been analyzed in terms of three nonrelated legal doc-
trines: (1) failure to exhaust state remedies, (2) waiver, and (3)
adequate and independent state ground of decision.
A. Exhaustion Of State Remedies
The federal courts have held consistently that habeas corpus relief
will not be granted to a state prisoner who has a state remedy avail-
able"0 through direct appeal or collateral attack.1" The power of the
federal courts to issue the writ in such a case is unquestioned,12 but
courts have refrained from exercising this power" in the interest of
Thus, the Court in Frank held that the state court must give the petitioner an oppor-
tunity to raise his constitutional claim in the state courts and if it did not, habeas corpus
was available. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). The Court in Brown held that
if the validity of a state decision to detain the petitioner rested on the determination of the
constitutional claim that the state determination was erroneous, the federal court must ascer-
tain whether the state court's decision was correct, using a de novo hearing if necessary.
'However, if a prisoner is detained lawfully under one count of the indictment, he
cannot challenge the lawfulness of a second count by federal habeas corpus. McNally v.
Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
' Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 Harv. L.
Rev. 1315 (1961).
"Ex pare Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
"Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
12Ex pare Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). "The rule is not one defining power but one
which relates to the appropriate exercise of power." Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27
(1939).
"See Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176 (1884):
The forbearance which courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, administered under
a single system, exercise toward each other, whereby conflicts are avoided by
avoiding interference with the process of each other, is a principle of comity,
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orderly administration of state procedure. Exhaustion of state reme-
dies has not been required if the remedy was inadequate for proper
review of the federal question" or if the state offered no process to
review the question." The requirement of exhaustion, with its ex-
ceptions, was codified as section 2254 of the Judicial Code." Soon
after the codification, the Supreme Court in Darr v. Burford7 held
that a state prisoner ordinarily must seek certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court in order to fulfill the requirement of exhaus-
tion of state remedies.
Uncertainty remained, however, because of the statutory require-
ment that the writ of habeas corpus is to be denied "unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the state. . . ."" It was unclear whether this statute required the
applicant to show that he had perfected a complete state appeal and
that no other state remedies existed or to show merely that there
were no state remedies available at the time of application regardless
of his prior efforts to utilize state remedies." The results of the de-
cisions indicate that the Supreme Court adopted the first interpreta-
tion. The reasoning of the opinions, however, leaves the issue in
doubt for they did not clearly indicate which of the three possible
theories was used to deny the writ.
An illuminating example of the confusion surrounding section
2254 is Daniels v. Allen." Applicant Daniels was one day late in filing
notice of appeal and lost his state right to appeal his constitutional
claim. The United States Supreme Court denied the writ, using the
following language:
with perhaps no higher sanction than the utility which comes from concord;
but between state courts and those of the United States it is something more.
It is a principle of right and of law, and, therefore, of necessity. Id. at 182.
"'Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
"Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
1628 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958). The text of the statute reads:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted unless it ap-
pears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the state, or that there is either an absence of available state corrective process
or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect
the rights of the prisoner.
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the state, within the meaning of this section, if he has the
right under the law of the state to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented.
17339 U.S. 200 (1950).
"s28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958). (Emphasis added.) See note 16 supra for complete text of
statute.
"Daniels v. Allen, decided with Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 482 (1953); Ex parte
Spencer, 228 U.S. 652 (1913).
2o Ibid.
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The state furnished an adequate and easily-complied-with method of
appeal .... Of course, Federal habeas corpus is allowed where time
has expired without appeal when the prisoner is detained without op-
portunity to appeal because of lack of counsel, incapacity, or some
interference by officials .... Failure to appeal is much like failure to
raise a known and existing question of unconstitutional proceeding or
action prior to conviction or commitment. Such failure, of course, bars
subsequent objection to conviction on those grounds . . . .A failure
to use a state's available remedy, in the absence of some interference or
incapacity ... bars federal habeas corpus. The statute requires that the
applicant exhaust available state remedies. To show that the time has
passed for appeal is not enough to empower the Federal District Court
to issue the writ."1 (Emphasis added.)
The italicized words speak in terms of forfeiture for failure to utilize
the state's appellate remedies but the preceding language obscures the
true reasoning of the court by speaking in terms of waiver and in-
dependent state ground of decision.
B. Waiver
Although there is a presumption against waiver of constitutional
rights,2 2 certain constitutional guarantees-such as right to trial by
jury," right to counsel,"4 and privilege against self-incrimination 5-
may be waived by criminal defendants. Federal district courts often
have used the waiver theory to deny habeas corpus if the applicant
failed to raise his constitutional claim in the state's trial court or if,
having raised it in the trial court, he failed to pursue it in the state's
appellate courts. In the latter case denial of the writ on the ground of
waiver seemed to be another way of holding that failure to exhaust
(i.e., pursue) state remedies resulted in a forfeiture of federal habeas
corpus rights. Johnson v. Zerbst e furnishes the controlling definitional
standard of waiver-"an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege.""' A state court's finding of waiver
is not binding on the federal courts because waiver of federal rights
is a federal question." Daniels v. Allen states that "failure to appeal
is much like failure to raise a known and existing question of un-
constitutional proceeding or action prior to commitment. Such failure
of course, bars subsequent objection to conviction on those grounds."2 "
2 1 Id. at 485-87. See also, Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947), which involves a federal
prisoner, but stands for the same principle.
" Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389 (1937).
"'Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
4Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
"2Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
20304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17 Id. at 464.
"Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
"344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
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This phraseology indicates that waiver is an independent ground of
30denial of the writ.
C. Adequate And Independent State Ground Of Decision
In cases arising in state courts involving questions of both state law
and federal law, the doctrine developed that if the decision rested on
an adequate and independent state ground, the federal court would
not review the federal question."a The reason for such a rule is
obvious. If the state court decides the federal question correctly, no
purpose is served by an appeal which affirms the judgment; if it de-
cides the federal question incorrectly, the judgment still will not be
changed because the decision can be sustained on the state ground.
In either case, if the federal court reviews the question it would
render the equivalent of an advisory opinion. The doctrine also has
been applied to state procedural grounds. In Edelman v. Californiat
the Court stated that it was powerless to decide whether constitu-
tional rights had been violated if a federal question was not raised
reasonably in accordance with state law requirements and that such
noncompliance with local law was an adequate state ground of de-
cision. Language in Daniels v. Allen indicated that the doctrine did
apply to federal habeas except in cases in which extraordinary or
exceptional circumstances were presented: "The state furnished an
adequate and easily-complied-with method of appeal .... A failure
to use a state's available remedy . . .bars federal habeas corpus."'
To be adequate the state ground must be "sufficiently broad to
maintain the judgment of that court '  and it "must be free from
certain infirmities so that it will justify a foreclosing of consideration
of the federal issues involved in the case."3 The question of adequacy
is to be determined by federal law.' State procedural grounds have
been held inadequate if the state rule: (1) evades the federal ques-
" See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 559 n.2 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
" Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 634-36 (1875); for the in-
troduction of the doctrine into federal habeas corpus see Irvin v. Dowd, in which the Court
stated: "We do not reach the question whether federal habeas corpus would have been avail-
able to the petitioner had the Indiana Supreme Court rested its decision on the [state]
ground." 359 U.S. 394, 406 (1959). Professor Hart advocated the adequate state ground
doctrine. Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 118-19
(1959). Professor Reitz disagreed strongly. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an
Abortive State Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1338-63 (1961).
3a 3 4 4 U.S. 357 (1953).
3 344 U.S. 443, 485-87 (1953). (Emphasis added.) See text accompanying note 21
a4 United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345, 359 (2d Cir. 1962).
25 Ibid.
"
0Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 318-19 (1958).
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tion,"7 (2) discriminates against the particular prisoner,"' (3) bars
unreasonably the federal rights,"" or (4) has no genuine basis in state
law."0
III. SUMMARY PRIOR TO FAY v. NOIA
Until 1963, federal habeas corpus relief under section 2254 of
the Judicial Code was administered under the following rules. The
state prisoner was required to exhaust all available state remedies
unless he could bring himself within one of the exceptions.' Exhaus-
tion of state remedies usually entailed petition to the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari." It was not clear whether section 2254
contained an implied doctrine of forfeiture if the applicant suffered
an abortive state proceeding. The Court often denied federal habeas
corpus relief to an applicant on the ground that he had waived his
federal claim, or on the ground that the conviction could be sustain-
ed by an adequate state ground independent from the alleged viola-
tion of federal rights. The reasoning of the courts in denying habeas
corpus relief generally was unclear, but one or a combination of
these three theories usually resulted in a denial of the federal remedy.
IV. FAY v. NOIA"
In 1942, Noia and two others were convicted of felony murder on
the basis of their signed confessions. Noia failed to appeal because
he did not want to burden his family financially and because he
recognized the possibility of a death sentence in a new trial. His
accomplices did appeal, however, and after extended legal proceed-
ings (which were not available to Noia because of his failure to
appeal) the confessions were found to have been coerced and the
convictions were set aside. Armed with a stipulation that his confes-
sion was coerced, Noia sought federal habeas corpus relief in 1960,
eighteen years after conviction. Relief was denied in the district court
because the judge interpreted section 225444 as implying forfeiture of
federal habeas corpus relief in cases of abortive state proceedings. "
" Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904).
"s United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962).
asDavis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923); Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955)
(dissenting opinion).
4Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
4'28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958); see Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).4 2 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
43 3 7 2 U.S. 391 (1963).
4428 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
" United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 183 F. Supp. 222, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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The writ was granted by the court of appeals on a finding that ex-
ceptional circumstances existed which excused strict compliance with
the section." The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds and
rendered a decision on federal habeas that affected all three legal
doctrines involved in abortive state procedings.
A. Effect On Exhaustion Of State Remedies Doctrine
The Court answered squarely the question whether section 225447
contained an implied doctrine of forfeiture by holding that Noia's
failure to appeal was not a failure to exhaust the remedies available
in the courts of the state within the meaning of that section. That
requirement was held to refer only to exhaustion of state remedies
still open to the applicant at the time he files his application for habeas
corpus in the federal court."' This holding substantially strengthened
federal habeas corpus as a collateral remedy to assure protection of
an individual's constitutional rights. The Court substantially over-
ruled Darr v. Bur ford" by holding that (1) failure to seek certiorari
in the United States Supreme Court will not bar a state prisoner
from federal habeas relief and (2) certiorari is not essential to the
statutory requirement of present exhaustion." This ruling should
relieve the Court of numerous petitions for certiorari by state prison-
ers seeking to forge an unnecessary link in the chain of remedies.'
B. Effect On Adequate And Independent State Ground Doctrine
The Court overruled Daniels v. Allen" by deciding that the doc-
trine under which a state procedural default is held to constitute an
adequate and independent ground of decision is applicable only in
the case of a direct appeal and will not limit a federal court in a
habeas corpus proceeding." In other words, the decisions " which
compelled an inquiry on appeal into the adequacy of the state pro-
cedural grounds are not applicable in a habeas corpus proceeding.
4United States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962). "But we cannot
assert with confidence that section 2254 only refers to present state remedies. Language in
certain recent Supreme Court decisions indicates that interpreting the section to apply only
to the exhaustion of presently available remedies would be erroneous." Id. at 356.
4728 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
4' 372 U.S. at 435. With this decision, the Court adopts Professor Hart's view. See Hart,
supra note 31, at 112-14.
49 339 U.S. 200 (1950). See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
so 372 U.S. at 435-36.
" "[T]he requirement of Darr v. Burford has proved only to be an unnecessarily bur-
densome step in the orderly processing of the federal claims of those convicted of state
crimes." 372 U.S. at 437.
52 344 U.S. 443, 482 (1953). See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
a 372 U.S. at 428-34.
14 See notes 32-40 supra and accompanying text.
" Speaking of the problem generally, the Court in Noia proceeds thusly: "Despite the
NOTES1964]
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If section 2254" applies only to remedies presently available and if
the adequate state ground doctrine does not limit federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction, the question of procedural adequacy becomes
moot."' Thus, in the instant case the Court expressly disclaimed any
opinion as to the adequacy of the state ground of decision.s The
basis for such a holding is that a conviction that is procured in an
unconstitutional manner is not made legitimate by a forfeiture of
state remedies." Furthermore, the decision seems to respect the intent
of the statute of 186760 to create an efficacious collateral remedy,
independent of appeal, which would prevent the extinguishing of
federal substantive rights."1
Court's refusal to give binding wegiht to state court determinations of the merits in habeas,
it has not infrequently suggested that where the state court declines to reach the merits be-
cause of a procedural default, the federal courts may be foreclosed from granting the re-
lief sought on habeas corpus. But the Court's practice in this area has been far from uni-
form ...... 372 U.S. at 424. The Court states, "Moore v. Dempsey . . . is the most
striking example of the Court's seeming refusal to give effect to a state procedural ground,
though the Court's language is ambiguous." 372 U.S. at 425 n. 36. (Emphasis added.) It
should be noted that Moore v. Dempsey was not an abortive state proceeding. An appeal
was taken by Moore and his four codefendants. Hicks v. State, 143 Ark. 158, 220 S.W.
308 (1920). State habeas corpus was denied. State v. Martineau, 149 Ark. 237, 232 S.W.
609 (1921). The prisoners exhausted all state remedies. The Court in Moore suggested the
remedy as applied was not an adequate state remedy because of the fact that the state ap-
pelate court's treatment was too perfunctory and was not acceptable as a proper review
of the case. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923). Under this view of the case, which
was followed in Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944) and codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1958), the writ would lie before or after exhaustion.
5628 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
5 However, short of this holding for purposes of habeas corpus, the recognized tests
of adequacy would have compelled a different result. (1) New York was not evading the
federal question on state grounds; no argument of evasion was raised. (2) New York was
not discriminating against Noia because any other prisoner who did not appeal would be
denied relief. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 535. (3) The rule requiring appeal is basic, reason-
able, and fair. It is necessary to an orderly administration of justice that a conviction be-
come final when the defendant chooses not to appeal. See Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
486 (1953).
There is a genuine basis in New York law for the rule applied by the state court that
all parties must appeal to preserve their legal defenses. In the strikingly similar fact situation
of People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 (1927), four defendants were tried to-
gether and convicted on the same evidence for attempted robbery. Rizzo, the only one who
appealed, was successful in gaining a reversal. The court noted: "If he were not guilty,
neither were the other three. As the others, however, did not appeal, there is no remedy for
them through the courts; their judgments stand and they must serve their sentences." Id.
at 890.
5' 372 U.S. at 429.
9 Id. at 427.
e Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, S 1, 14 Stat. 385.
es And if because of inadvertence or neglect he runs afoul of a state procedural
requirement, and thereby forfeits his state remedies, appellate and collateral,
as well as direct review thereof in this Court, those consequences should be
sufficient to vindicate the State's valid interest in orderly procedure. Whatever
residuum of state interest there may be under such circumstances is mani-
festly insufficient in the face of the federal policy, drawn from the ancient
principles of the writ of habeas corpus, embodied both in the Federal Con-
stitution and in the habeas corpus provisions of the Judicial Code, and con-
sistently upheld by this Court, of affording an effective remedy for restraints
contrary to the Constitution. 372 U.S. at 433-34.
NOTES
C. Effect On Waiver Doctrine
Considering the Court's decision on exhaustion of state remedies
and on procedural defaults, waiver is apparently the only bar to
federal habeas corpus relief after an abortive state proceeding. Thus,
the question of waiver becomes the critical issue in determining
whether the applicant is entitled to a habeas corpus hearing. In the
instant case the Court decided that, under the circumstances, Noia's
failure to appeal could not be deemed such an intelligent and under-
standing waiver of his right to appeal as to justify withholding fed-
eral habeas corpus relief. The definition of waiver in Johnson v.
Zerbst-"an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege" 0 5-still controls, but the Court adds that the writ
should not be denied for reasons that cannot "fairly be described as
the deliberate bypassing of state procedures," 3 and that the standard
"depends on the considered choice of the petitioner."" Noia inten-
tionally abandoned his right of appeal, but he did not deliberately
bypass the state procedures."
Under section 22430 the Court recognizes "a limited discretion
in the federal judge to deny relief to an applicant under certain cir-
cumstances.""7 The Court holds that in the exercise of this limited
discretion conferred by section 2243," it is "open to the federal court
on habeas to deny ... all relief"" for any reasons "that can fairly be
described as the deliberate bypassing of the state procedures.""0 Al-
though such a course is open to the judge, apparently, he does not
have to deny it even if he does find a deliberate bypass. Traditionally,
waiver of a right cuts off the remedy, but for the purposes of habeas
corpus this concept must be regarded as modified. It is doubtful
whether any prisoner would deliberately bypass the state appellate
system in an attempt to vindicate his federal claim in a habeas corpus
proceeding. If he has a constitutional objection, he first should follow
the state appellate route before seeking habeas corpus, for if he de-
liberately bypasses the state system, the possibility exists that he will
be denied a hearing. The deliberate bypass concept probably does not
2304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
03 372 U.S. at 439.
04 Ibid.
05 Noia waived his right to appeal. He did not waive his right to be free from convic-
tion on the basis of a coerced confession, 372 U.S. at 427, so his action in state court is
unimportant. See Reitz, supra note 31 at 1333.
06 "The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter
aS law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
07372 U.S. at 438.
0s28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1958).
9 372 U.S. at 439. (Emphasis added.)
70 Ibid.
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involve a specific intent to obtain habeas corpus relief by thwarting
state procedural rules, but it will require a more definitive statement
to indicate its scope.
D. Summary Of Effects Of Fay v. Noia
From the explicit (and implicit) holdings in Fay v. Noia, the
following rules apparently will govern future habeas corpus pro-
ceedings under section 2254."' First, if there are state remedies present-
ly available, the applicant will come squarely within section 2254 and
will be required to exhaust his state remedies unless his case falls with-
in one of the recognized exceptions. Application to the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari from the final decision of the state is
not required for full exhaustion of a state remedy and failure to
apply for certiorari will not bar a state prisoner from federal habeas
corpus relief. A procedural default by an applicant in the state court
will not constitute an adequate and independent state ground so as
to bar a federal district court from granting habeas relief as a matter
of law. Third, if there are no state remedies presently available (in
cases in which the state prisoner did not bring himself within one of
the section 2254 exceptions), the federal district court judge must
decide if the applicant has deliberately bypassed the state courts. If
he has, the judge has a limited discretion to deny relief without a
hearing on the merits; if he has not, he will be granted a hearing.
V. CONCLUSION
The principal case is extremely important when applied in con-
junction with numerous other habeas corpus cases the Court has de-
cided recently. Because it substantially broadens the scope of inquiry
in a habeas corpus proceeding, it potentially extends the collateral
federal remedy to every state prisoner who alleges an unconstitutional
detention after suffering an abortive state proceeding. It will enable
applicants to test the validity of their convictions under the theories
of Mapp v. Ohio"' and Gideon v. Wainwright." Most of the courts
that have considered the question have held that Mapp and Gideon
apply retroactively. 4 If the Supreme Court accepts this view, state
7' 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
72367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Sisk v. Lane, 219 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ind. 1963); United
States ex rel. Emerick v. Denno, 220 F. Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
73372 U.S. 335 (1963), noted in 18 Sw. L.J. 284 (1964).
74 United States ex rel. Durocher v. La Vallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1964) (Gideon);
United States ex rel. Craig v. Myers, 329 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1964) (Gideon); Yeager v.
Director, Dep't of Welfare & Institutions, 319 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1963) (Gideon); Hall
v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
809 (1963) (Mapp); Ex parte Hope, - Tex. Crim. -, 374 S.W.2d 441 (1964) (Gideon).
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prisoners should be able to secure their release under Fay v. Noia
without having appealed the constitutional point. The waiver test
would not seem to be a problem because the prisoner could hardly
waive a right that was held not to exist at the time of his trial."
5
Even if these convictions are ten or twenty years old, the prisoners
may be freed and the state probably will be precluded from trying
some prisoners again because of lack of evidence, unavailability of
witnesses, or shortage of judicial facilities.
Viewed realistically, habeas corpus is effectively substituted for
appeal in the instant decision.7' The state's interest in finality of
convictions certainly would have been protected better if Noia had
appealed; but the predilection of the Court today is to weigh the
individual's rights heavily in balancing his interest against that of
the state.7 The immediate consequence of the decision will be an
increase in the number of applications from state prisoners to the
federal district courts."8 Because habeas corpus is governed by equit-
able principles,7" the judge to whom application is made must exercise
Contra, United States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963),cert.
granted, 377 U.S. 930 (1964) (Mapp); Gaitan v. United States, 317 F.2d 494 (10th Cit.
1963) (Mapp); People v. Muller, 11 N.Y.2d 154, 182 N.E.2d 99 (1962) (MaPP); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Craig v. Banmiller, 410 Pa. 584, 189 A.2d 875 (1963) (Gideon).
" Until 1963, Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) governed.
78 The writ of habeas corpus in federal courts is not authorized for state prison-
ers at the discretion of the federal court. It is only authorized when a state
prisoner is in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
. . . That fact is not to be tested by the use of habeas corpus in lieu of an
appeal. To allow habeas corpus in such circumstances would subvert the
entire system of state criminal justice and destroy state energy in the detection
and punishment of crime. Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485 (1953). (Em-
phasis added.)
In a case dealing with a federal prisoner, the Court stated, "So far as convictions obtained
in the federal courts are concerned, the general rule is that the writ of habas corpus will
not be allowed to do service for an appeal. . . . Of course, if [the defendants] . . . had
pursued the appellate course and failed, their cases would be quite different. But since they
chose not to pursue the remedy which they had, we do not think they should now be al-
lowed to justify their failure by saying they deemed any appeal futile." Sunal v. Large,
332 U.S. 174, 178-81 (1947). Apparently, Noia could not have succeeded if he were a
federal prisoner.
" See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963).
s It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood
of worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end
up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search. Nor is it any
answer to say that few of these petitions in any court really result in the dis-
charge of the petitioner. That is the condemnation of the procedure which
has encouraged frivolous cases. In this multiplicity of worthless cases, states
are compelled to default or to defend the integrity of their judges and their
official records, sometimes concerning trials or pleas that were closed many
years ago. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (concurring opinion).
Mr. Justice Clark points out that from 1946 to 1957 the petitioners were successful in
1.49o of the cases. The number of applications per year increased from 127 in 1941 to
1,232 in 1962. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445-46 (dissenting opinion).
"9United States ex tel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 573 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
